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FEDERAL GIFT TAX ASPECTS OF RELEASE OF DOWER
AND OTHER MARITAL RIGHTS UNDER DIVORCE
OR SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
JAmiS A. TAYLOR*
A payment, under a divorce or separation agreement, of money
or property by one spouse to the other in consideration of the
payee's release of all marital rights, exclusive of support rights, may
or may not be subject to the Federal gift tax.
That part of a payment, or payments, which represents the rea-
sonable value of support rights, constitutes a consideration in money
or money's worth, and, to the extent a transfer does not exceed the
reasonable value of the support rights, it is to be treated as made
for such consideration, and is not subject to Federal gift tax.1
This paper is confined to a consideration of the Federal gift tax
liability, if any, on that part of a payment or payments made pur-
suant to a divorce or separation agreement, which exceeds the value
of the support rights, and is made in consideration of a spouse's
relinquishment of all other marital rights.
Sec. 1002 (Gift Tax) of the Internal Revenue Code, provides:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount
by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the
consideration shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this
chapter, be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing
the amount of gifts- made during the calendar year.
Sec. 812 (b) (Estate Tax) of the Code provides, in part:
. . . a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower,
curtesy, or of a statutory, estate created in lieu of dower or
curtesy, or of other marital rights, in the decedent's property
or estate, shall not be considered to; any extent a consideration
"in money or money's. worth".
A provision similar to Sectior 812 (b ) does not appear under
the gift tax provisions of the Code, nur is it incorporated in the gift
tax regulation%
E. T. 19F (a ruling of the Treasury Department applicable to both
Code provisions) provides:.
'Attorney" at-Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
t. E.T. 19 1946-2'Cum. Buit. 166.
2. Ibid.
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Transfers of property pursuant to an agreement incident to
divorce or legal separation are not made for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth to the extent that
they are made in consideration of a relinquishment or promised
relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created
in lieu of dower or curtesy, or other marital rights in the trans-
feror's property or estate; to the extent that the transfers are
made in satisfaction of support rights the transfers are held
to be for an adequate and full consideration. The value of the
relinquished support rights shall be ascertained on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
The Treasury Department's position, expressed in the foregoing
ruling, is bottomed on the correlation of the gift and estate taxes,
and is based, in part, upon the decision in Merrill v. Fahs.8
In this case the Supreme Court, in holding that an ante-nuptial
transfer was subject to the gift tax, found that Congress intended
that the "consideration" or "relinquishment" provision in the estate
tax law also applies to the gift tax, stating, in part, as follows:
The guiding light is what was said in Estate of Sanford v. Com-
missioner, (308 U. S. 39, 44): "The gift tax was supplemen-
tary to the estate tax. The two are in pari nateria and must
be construed together." The phrase on the meaning of which
decision must largely turn- that is, transfers for other than
"an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth"
- came into the gift tax by way of estate tax provisions.
In Harris v. Commissioner, ante, the rationale of the Merrill de-
cision was held to be equally applicable to post-nuptial settlements.
Payments in accordance with a divorce settlement which are in
excess of the wife's value of support rights, ordinarily are made to
obtain a release of the wife's inheritance rights in the husband's
estate, and, since a payment made in consideration of a relinquish-
ment or promised relinquishment of marital rights, exclusive of
support rights, would be taxed in the estate of the transferor, un-
der the correlation argument, and under the general principle ex-
pressed in E. T. 19, supra, a similar payment in accordance with a
divorce settlement would be taxed as a gift.
The case of Commissioner v. Barnard Estat appears to have
been the first decision of an appellate court to sustain this conclu-
3. 324 U. S. 308, 33 A.F.T.R. 587 (1945).
4. 176 F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 6
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sion of the Treasury Department. In this case, Mrs. Barnard paid
her husband $50,000 under a written separation agreement, under
the terms of which her husband relinquished any claims on her
property. In addition, she promised orally to pay him an additional
$50,000 upon divorce, and did pay him that amount after the decree
was obtained. The divorce decree incorporated the written contract
but not the oral agreement. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the entire $100,000 paid was taxable as a
gift. As the wife had no obligation to support her husband, the value
of support rights were not involved. The Court rejected the argu-
ment that the ratification of the written agreement by a subsequent
divorce decree brought the case within the rule of Commissioner v.
Converse,5 a case which previously had been decided by the same
Court.
In Commissioner v. Converse the parties had signed a separation
agreement calling for monthly alimony payments. The husband
appeared and denied that the agreement made was fair and just,
alleged that a single payment would be for the best interests of the
parties, and asked that the Court decree a lump-sum payment. After
a trial, in which this was one of the issues litigated, the Court de-
creed such settlement. When this settlement was attacked as a
gift, the Court held that any amount paid in accordance with the
divorce decree represented a discharge of a money judgment, and
the "payment of a liquidated debt created by the judgment, and
the discharge thereby of the respondent's obligation to pay for that
debt was an adequate consideration in money or money's worth for
the transfer".
In the Barnard case, supra, the Court pointed out that the Barnards
had made a settlement agreement, the payment of which was made
according to the terms of the agreement before Mrs. Barnard had
decided to bring divorce proceedings, whereas the settlement obliga-
tions in the Converse case arose directly from the decree in the
divorce case, which created of its own force a judgment debt. The
Court commented, further, that the Converse decision had been cited
"beyond its scope".
The earlier Tax Court decisions would appear to have adopted
the primary test of donative intent in its determination of divorce
settlement gift tax questions.
6
5. 163 F. 2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947).
6. Herbert Jones, 1 T.C. 1207 (1943); William Barclay Harding, 11 T.C.
1051 (1948); Edward B. McLean, 11 T.C. 543 (1948); Clarence B. Mitchell,
6 T.C. 159 (1946); Albert V. Moore, 10 T.C. 393 (1948); Edmund C. Con-
verse, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
19541
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Accordingly, three possible rules were established in the earlier
decisions:
(1) The Treasury Departient-Battad rule: All amounts paid
in divorce settlements in excess of the value of the support
rights, are subject to a gift tax insofar as they are paid for
the release of inheritance and other marital rights.
(2) The Converse rule: Any payment made in accordance with a
divorce decree which is solely the result of a contest in Court
will avoid a gift tax.
(3) The Tax Court rule: Any payment made in accordance with
a divorce decree which is the result of an "arns-length" bat-
gaining will not give rise to a gift tax.
The confusion and conflict which is to be found in the earlier de-
cisions of the Federal Cotitfs seems now to have been settled by
the decision of the Supreme Court in Ilars r. Comnmisioiter of In-
ternal Revenue and because of the importance of that decision, it
is quoted at some length. In the Harris decision, a decision of the
lower Court was reversed, and it was held that settiements incident
to a divorce were not subject to the Federal gift tax.
In this case, the petitioner divorced her husband in Levada in
1943. Both she and her husband had substantial property interests.
They reached an understanding as regards the unscrambling of these
interests, the settlement of all litigated claims to the separate proper-
ties, the assumption of obligations, and the transfer of properties.
The Court observed, and held:'
If the parties had without more gone ahead and voluntarily
unravelled their business interests on the basis of this compro-
mise, there would be no question but what the gift tax would
be payable. For there would have been a "promise or agree-
ment" that affected a relinquishment of marital rights in proper-
ty. It therefore would fall under the ban of the provision of
the estate tax which by judicial construction had been incor-
porated into the gift tax statute.
But the parties did not simply undertake a voluntary contractual
division of their property interests. They were faced with the
fact that Nevada law not only authorized but instructed the di-
vorce court to decree a just and equitable disposition of both
the community and the separate property of the parties. The
Agreement recited that it was executed in order to effect a
7. 340 V. S. 106, 39 lA.F.T.R. 1002 (1950) (4 dissents).
[Vol. 6
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settlement of the respective property rights of the parties "in
the event a divorce should be decreed"; and it provided that the
agreement should be submitted to the divorce court "for its ap-
proval". It went on to say, "It is of the essence of this agree-
ment that the settlement herein provided for shall not become
operative in any manner nor shall any of the recitals or cove-
nants herein become binding upon either party unless a decree
of absolute divorce between the parties shall be entered in the
pending Nevada action".
If the agreements had stopped there and were in fact submitted
to the court, it is clear that the gift tax would not be applicable.
That arrangement would not be a "promise or agreement" in
the statutory sense. It would be wholly conditional upon the
entry of the decree: the divorce court might or might not ac-
cept the provisions of the arrangement as the measure of the
respective obligations; it might indeed add to or subtract from
them. The decree, not the arrangement submitted to the court,
would fix the rights and obligations of the parties. That was
the theory of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Maresi, 2
Cir., 156 F. (2) 929, and we think it sound.
Even the Commissioner concedes that the result would be cor-
rect in case the property settlement was litigated in the divorce
action. That was what happened in Coinmissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Converse, 2 Cir. 163 F. (2) 131, where the divorce
court decreed a lump sum award in lieu of monthly payments
provided by the separation agreement. Yet without the decree
there would be no enforceable, existing agreement whether the
settlement was litigated or unlitigated. Both require the ap-
proval of the court before an obligation arises. The happen-
stance that the divorce court might approve the entire settle-
ment, or modify it in unsubstantial details, or work out material
changes seems to us as unimportant. In each case it is the
decree that creates the rights and the duties; and a decree is
not a "promise or agreement" in any sense- popular or sta-
tutory.
If "the transfer" of marital rights in property is effected by the
parties, it is pursuant to a "promise or agreement" in the mean-
ing of the statute. If "the transfer" is effected by court decree,
no "promise or agreement" of the parties is the operative fact.
In no realistic sense is a court decree a "promise or agreement"
between the parties to a litigation. If finer, more legalistic lines
are to be drawn, Congress must do it.
1954)
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The Court then went on to discuss the tax effect, or rather non-
tax effect, of a further provision in the Harris agreement that "...
the covenants in this agreement shall survive any decrees of divorce
which may be entered." On this point it was held, in substance, that
the gift tax statute is concerned with the source of rights and not
with the manner in which they may be enforced at some distant time.
In George G. McMurtry,8 the significance and determinative ef-
fect of the incorporation of the settlement agreement in the decree
and order of the Court is emphasized. The McMurtry case involved
transfers in trust for the benefit of each of the husband's two former
wives, and the decision was premised upon the findings of fact that
each transfer was made in consideration of the wife's release of
both her support rights and property rights arising out of the marital
relationship, and the settlement agreements were negotiated, effected,
and performed without reference to divorce decrees later rendered.
It was held by the Tax Court in the McMurtry case, under the au-
thority of the Barnard case, that the transfers were taxable as gifts
to the extent they exceeded the values of the respective support
rights of the wives.
The reversal, in part, of the Tax Court decision in McMurtry by
the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit would not appear to have
been based upon disagreement with the legal principle established
in the Tax Court decision, but upon a material difference in finding
of fact with reference to the transfers to one of the wives.
The Tax Court's decision in the McMurtry case is clearly dis-
tinguished from, and reconciled with, the decision of the Supreme
Court in Harris, in the following excerpts from the McMurtry de-
cision:
It is now clear from the Supreme Court's decision in the recent
case of Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106, that the ra-
tionale of the Merrill and Wemyss cases is also applicable to
postnuptial settlements, where it can be said that the transfer of
property was effected by the promise or agreement of the spouses.
In such an instance the transfer of property is taxable as a gift
to the extent it was made in consideration of the release of
marital property rights. Where the postnuptial settlement is
followed by the entry of a divorce decree, we have the prelimi-
nary question whether the transfer of property was -founded
upon the promise or agreement or upon the divorce decree. If
it bedetermined that the divorce decree effected the transfer of
8. 16 T.C. 168 (1951), rev'd in part, 203 F. 2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 6
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property between the parties, then there is no promise or agree-
ment concerning marital rights in property to which the prin-
ciples of the Merrill and Wemyss cases are applicable, and any
transfers of property are free from gift tax liability.
We are convinced that the facts surrounding the transfer in
trust to Mabel Post McMurtry and the transfers in trust to
Louise Hunt McMurtry are so entirely different from the facts
considered to be decisive by the Supreme Court in the Harris
case that our determination is not governed by that decision. The
holding of the Supreme Court in Harris v. Commissioner, supra,
that the transfer of property to the husband was not taxable as
a gift was hinged on the fact that the effective operation of the
property settlement was by its terms subject to a condition pre-
cedent, that there be an entry of a divorce decree. In the pre-
sent case it is apparent from the terms of the postnuptial agree-
ment between petitioner and Mabel Post McMurtry that its
effectiveness was in no way dependent on the entry of a divorce
decree. Furthermore, when she obtained a divorce, the decree
failed to provide for alimony and made no mention of the sepa-
ration agreement. It follows that the transfer in trust for her
benefit was solely founded upon and made effective by the pro-
mise or agreement of the parties. Thus we hold that to the
extent the transfer was in consideration for the release of her
marital property rights, it is taxable as a gift under section 1002
of the Code.
The Harris case is distinguished further in Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue v. Tillie Blum,9 Hardenberg v. Commissioner,'0 and
Paul Rosenthal.'1 In the latter case, although the separation agree-
ment was made a part of a later divorce decree, the effectiveness of
the agreement was not made dependent upon the decree, but, on the
contrary, the agreement left either party free to institute or not
institute divorce proceedings.
Under the Harris decision, and the McMurtry decision, which ex-
plains and distinguishes the Harris decision, and provided:
(1) The terms of settlement are arrived at through arms-length
negotiations between the parties;
(2) No part of the payments made under the terms of the settle-
ment agreement is made with donative intent;
9. 187 F. 2d 180 (7th Cir. 1951).
10. 198 F. 2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952).
11. 17 T.C. 1047 (1951).
1954]
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(3) The agreement recites that it is executed in order to effect a
settlement of the respective property rights of the parties in
the event a divorce should be decreed, and is made contingent
upon the decree;
(4) The operation of the settlement agreement is made expressly
subject to the condition precedent that the terms of the agree-
ment be considered, approved, and decreed by the court;
(5) The consideration, approval, and adoption of the settlement
agreement by the court is expressly stated in the decree and
order of the court,
it would now appear that payments made under the terms of a settle-
ment agreement, and in strict accord with the court decree, will not
be subject to the Federal gift tax.
Assuming a Federal gift tax may not result, under the citcum-
stances discussed, the interesting, and important, collateral question
may arise: whether the transferee spouse, under the broad provisions
of Section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines gross
income for the purpose of the Federal income tax, may not be sub-
ject to Federal income tax upon gift tax-free payments received.
Up to the present time, it does not appear that the Treasury De-
ptrtment has adopted this contention in any case in which a trans-
fer was held to be gift-tax free under the rule established in the
Harris and related cases.
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